Wednesday, January 07, 2015

Predicting team SH% from player talent

For NHL teams, shooting percentage (SH%) doesn't seem to carry over all that well from year to year. Here repeated from last post, are the respective correlations: 

-0.19  2014-15 vs. 2013-14
+0.30  2013-14 vs. 2012-13
+0.33  2012-13 vs. 2011-12
+0.03  2011-12 vs. 2010-11
-0.10  2010-11 vs. 2009-10
-0.27  2009-10 vs. 2008-09
+0.04  2008-09 vs. 2007-08

(All data is for 5-on-5 tied situations. Huge thanks to puckalytics.com for making the raw data available on their website.)

They're small. Are they real? It's hard to know, because of the small sample sizes. With only 30 teams, even if SH% were totally random, you'd still get coefficients of this size -- the SD of a random 30-team correlation is 0.19.  

That means there's a lot of noise, too much noise in which to discern a small signal. To reduce that noise, I thought I'd look at the individual players on the teams.  (UPDATE: Rob Vollman did this too, see note at bottom of post.)

Start with last season, 2013-14. I found every player who had at least 20 career shots in the other six seasons in the study. Then, I projected his 2013-14 "X-axis" shooting percentage as his actual SH% in those other seasons.  

For every team, I calculated its "X-axis" shooting percentage as the average of the individual player estimates.  

(Notes: I weighted the players by actual shots, except that if a player had more shots in 2013-14 than the other years, I used the "other years" lower shot total instead of the current one. Also, the puckalytics data didn't post splits for players who spent a year with multiple teams -- it listed them only with their last team. To deal with that, when I calculated "actual" for a team, I calculated it for the Puckalytics set of players.  So the team "actual" numbers I used didn't exactly match the official ones.)

If shooting percentage is truly (or mostly) random, the correlation between team expected and team actual should be low.  

It wasn't that low. It was +0.38.  

I don't want to get too excited about that +38, because most other years didn't show that strong an effect. Here are the correlations for those other years:

+0.38  2013-14
+0.45  2012-13
+0.13  2011-12
-0.07  2010-11
-0.34  2009-10
-0.01  2008-09
+0.16  2007-08

They're very similar to the season-by-season correlations at the top of the post ... which, I guess, is to be expected, because they're roughly measuring the same thing.  

If we combine all the years into one dataset, so we have 210 points instead of 30, we get 

--------------
+0.13  7 years

That could easily be random luck.  A correlation of +0.13 would be on the edge of statistical significance if the 210 datapoints were independent. But they're not, since every player-year appears up to six different times as part of the "X-axis" variable.

It's "hockey significant," though. The coefficient is +0.30. So, for instance, at the beginning of 2013-14, when the Leafs' players historically had outshot the Panthers' players by 2.96 percentage points ... you'd forecast the actual difference to be 0.89.  (The actual difference came out to be 4.23 points, but never mind.)

-----

The most recent three seasons appear to have higher correlations than the previous four. Again at the risk of cherry-picking ... what happens if we just consider those three?

+0.38  2013-14
+0.45  2012-13
+0.13  2011-12
--------------
+0.34  3 years

The +0.34 looks modest, but the coefficient is quite high -- 0.60. That means you have to regress out-of-sample performance only 40% back to the mean.  

Is it OK to use these three years instead of all seven? Not if the difference is just luck; only if there's something that actually makes the 2011-12 to 2013-14 more reliable.  

For instance ... it could be that the older seasons do worse because of selective sampling. If players improve slowly over their careers, then drop off a cliff ... the older seasons will be more likely comparing the player to his post-cliff performance. I have no idea if that's a relevant explanation or not, but that's the kind of argument you'd need to help justify looking at only the three seasons.

Well, at least we can check statistical significance. I created a simulation of seven 30-team seasons, where each identical team had an 8 percent chance of scoring on each of 600 identical shots. Then, I ran a correlation for only three of those seven seasons, like here.

The SD of that correlation coefficient was 0.12. So, the +0.34 in the real-life data was almost three SDs above random.

Still: we did cherry-pick our three seasons, so the raw probability is very misleading.  If it had been 8 SD or something, we would have been pretty sure that we found a real relationship, even after taking the cherry-pick into account. At 3 SD ... not so sure.

-----

Well, suppose we split the difference ... but on the conservative side. The 7-year coefficient is 0.30. The 3-year coefficient is 0.60.  Let's try a coefficient of 0.40, which is only 1/3 of the way between 0.30 and 0.60.

If we do that, we get that the predictive ability of SH% is: one extra goal per X shots in the six surrounding seasons forecasts 0.4 extra goals per X shots this season.

For an average team, 0.4 extra goals is around 5 extra shots, or 9 extra Corsis.

In his study last month, Tango found a goal was only 4 extra Corsis.  Why the difference? Because our studies aren't measuring the same thing.  We were asking the same general question -- "if you combine "goals" and "shots," does that give you a better prediction than "shots" alone? -- but doing so by asking different specific questions.  

Tango asked how you predict half a team's games predict the other half. I was asking how you predict a team's year from its players' six surrounding years. It's possible that the "half-year" method has more luck in it ... or that other differences factor in, also.

My gut says that the answers we found are still fairly consistent.

---



UPDATE: Rob Vollman, of "Hockey Abstract" fame, did a similar study last summer (which I read, but had forgotten about).  Slightly different methodology, I think, but the results seem consistent.  Sorry, Rob!



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Thursday, December 18, 2014

True talent levels for NHL team shooting percentage, part II

(Part I is here)

Team shooting percentage is considered an unreliable indicator of talent, because its season-to-season correlation is low. 

Here are those correlations from the past few seasons, for 5-on-5 tied situations.

-0.19  2014-15 vs. 2013-14
+0.30  2013-14 vs. 2012-13
+0.33  2012-13 vs. 2011-12
+0.03  2011-12 vs. 2010-11
-0.10  2010-11 vs. 2009-10
-0.27  2009-10 vs. 2008-09
+0.04  2008-09 vs. 2007-08

The simple average of all those numbers is +0.02, which, of course, is almost indistinguishable from zero. Even if you remove the first pair -- the 2014-15 stats are based on a small, season-to-date sample size -- it's only an average of +0.055.

(A better way to average them might be to square them (keeping the sign), then taking the root mean square. That gives +0 .11 and +0.14, respectively. But I'll just use simple additions in this post, even though they're probably not right, because I'm not looking for exact answers.)

That does indeed suggest that SH isn't that reliable -- after all, there were more negative seasons than strong positive ones.

But: what if we expand our sample size, by looking at the correlation between pairs that are TWO seasons apart? Different story, now:

+0.35   2014-15 vs. 2012-13
+0.12   2013-14 vs. 2011-12
+0.27   2012-13 vs. 2010-11
+0.12   2011-12 vs. 2009-10
+0.41   2010-11 vs. 2008-09
-0.03   2009-10 vs. 2007-08

These six seasons average +0.21, which ain't bad.

------

Part of the reason that the two-year correlations are high might be that team talent didn't change all that much in the seasons of the study. I checked the correlation between overall team talent, as measured by hockey-reference.com's "SRS" rating. For 2008-09 vs. 2013-14, the correlation was +0.50.

And that's for FIVE seasons apart. So far, we've only looked at two seasons apart.

I chose 2008-09 because you'll notice the correlations that include 2007-08 are nothing special. That, I think, is because team talent changed significantly between 07-08 and 08-09. If I rerun the SRS correlation for 2007-08 vs. 2013-14 -- that is, going back only one additional year -- it drops from +0.50 to only +0.25.

On that basis, I'm arbitrarily deciding to drop 2007-08 from the rest of this post, since the SH% discussion is based on an assumption that team talent stays roughly level.

------

But even if team talent changed little since 2008-09, it still changed *some*. So, wouldn't you still expect the two-year correlations to be lower than the one-year correlations? There's still twice the change in talent, albeit twice a *small* change.

You can look at it a different way -- if A isn't strongly related to B, and B isn't strongly related to C, then how can A be strongly related to C?

Well, I think it's the other way around. It's not just that A *can* be strongly related to C. It's that, if there's really a signal within the noise, you should *expect* A to be strongly related to C.

Consider 2009-10. In that year, every team had a certain SH% talent. Because of randomness, the set of 30 observed team SH% numbers varied from the true talent. The same would be true, of course, for the two surrounding seasons, 2008-09, and 2010-11.

But both those surrounding seasons had a substantial negative correlation with the middle season. That suggests that for each of those surrounding seasons, their luck varied from the middle season in the "opposite" way. Otherwise, the correlation wouldn't be negative.

For instance, maybe in the middle season, the Original Six teams were lucky, and the other 24 teams were unlucky. The two negative correlations with the surrounding seasons suggest that in each of those seasons, maybe it was the other way around, that the Original Six were unlucky, and the rest lucky.

Since the surrounding seasons both had opposite luck to the middle season, they're likely to have had similar luck to each other. 

In this case, they are. The A-to-B correlation is -0.27. The B-to-C correlation is -0.10. But the A-to-C correlation is +0.41. Positive, and quite large.

-0.10   2010-11 (A) vs. 2009-10 (B)
-0.27   2009-10 (B) vs. 2008-09 (C)
-----------------------------------
+0.41   2010-11 (A) vs. 2008-09 (C)


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This should be true even if SH% is all random -- that is, even if all teams have the same talent. The logic still holds: if A correlates to B the same way C correlates to B ... that means A and C are likely to be somewhat similar. 

I ran a series of three-season simulations, where all 30 teams were equal in talent. When both A and C had a similar, significant correlation to B (same sign, both above +/- 0.20), their correlation with each other averaged +0.06. 

In our case, we didn't get +0.06. We got something much bigger: +0.41. That's because the underlying real-life talent correlation isn't actually zero, as it was in the simulation. A couple of studies suggested it was around +0.15. 

So, the A-B was actually -0.25 "correlation points", relative to the trend: -0.10 relative to zero, plus -0.15 below typical. (I'm sure that isn't the way to do it statistically -- it's not perfectly additive like that -- but I'm just illustrating the point.)  Similarly, the B-C was actually -0.42 points.

Those are much larger effects when you correct them that way, so they have a stronger result. When I limited the simulation sample so both A-B and A-C had to be bigger than +/- 0.25, the average A-C correlation almost tripled, to +0.16. 

Add that +0.16 to the underlying +0.15, and you get +0.31. Still not the +0.41 from real life, but close enough, considering the assumptions I made and shortcuts I took.

------

Since we have six seasons with stable team talent, we don't have to stop at two-season gaps ... we can go all the way to five-season gaps, and pair every season with every other season. Here are the results:


         14-15  13-14  12-13  11-12  10-11  09-10  08-09  
--------------------------------------------------------
14-15           -0.19  +0.35  +0.20  +0.15  +0.46  -0.07  
13-14    -0.19         +0.30  +0.12  +0.27  -0.07  +0.42  
12-13    +0.35  +0.30         +0.33  +0.27  +0.24  +0.26  
11-12    +0.20  +0.12  +0.33         +0.03  +0.12  -0.08  
10-11    +0.15  +0.27  +0.27  +0.03         -0.10  +0.41  
09-10    +0.46  -0.07  +0.24  +0.12  -0.10         -0.27  
08-09    -0.07  +0.42  +0.26  -0.08  +0.41  -0.27


The average of all these numbers is ... +0.15, which is exactly what the other studies averaged out to. That's coincidence ... they used a different set of pairs, they didn't limit the sample to tie scores, and 14-15 hadn't existed yet. (Besides, I think if you did the math, you'd find you wanted the root of the average r-squared, which would be significantly higher than  +0.15.)

Going back to the A-B-C thing ... you'll find it still holds. If you look for cases where A-B and B-C are both significantly below the 0.15 average, A-C will be high. (Look in the same row or column for two low numbers.)  

For instance, in the 14-15 row, 13-14 and 08-09 are both negative. Look for the intersection of 13-14 and 08-09. As predicted, the correlation there is very high -- +0.42. 

By similar logic, if you find cases where A-B and B-C go in different directions -- one much higher than 0.15, the other much lower -- then, A-C should be low.

For instance, in the second row, 09-10 is -0.07, but 08-09 is +0.42. The prediction is that the intersection of 09-10 and 08-09 should be low -- and it is, -0.27.

------

Look at 2012-13. It has a strong positive correlation with every other season in the sample. Because of that, I originally guessed that 2012-13 is the most "normal" of all the seasons, the one where teams most played to their overall talent. In other words, I guessed that 2012-13 was the one with the least luck.

But, when I calculated the SDs of the 30 teams for each season ... 2012-13 was the *highest*, not the lowest. By far! And that's even adjusting for the short season. In fact, all the full seasons had a team SD of 1.00 percentage points or lower -- except that one, which was at the adjusted equivalent of 1.23.

What's going on?

Well, I think it's this: in 2012-13, instead of luck mixing up the differences in team talent, it exaggerated them. In other words: that year, the good teams got lucky, and the bad teams got unlucky. In 2012-13, the millionaires won most of the lotteries.

That kept the *order* of the teams the same -- which means that 2012-13 wound up the most exaggeratedly representative of teams' true talent.

Whether that's right or not, it seems that two things should be true:

-- With all the high correlations, 2012-13 should be a good indicator of actual talent over the seven-year span; and

-- Since we found that talent was stable, we should get good results if we add up all six years for each team, as if it was one season with six times as many games.* 

*Actually, about five times, since there are two short seasons in the sample -- 2012-13, and 2014-15, which is less than half over as I write this.

Well, I checked, and ... both guesses were correct.

I checked the correlation between 2012-13 vs. the sum of the other five seasons (not including the current 2014-15). It was roughly +0.54. That's really big. But, there's actually no value in that ... it was cherry-picked in retrospect. Still, it's just something I found interesting, that for a statistic that is said to have so little signal, a shortened season can still have a +0.54 correlation with the average of five other years!

As for the six-season averages ... those DO have value. Last post, when we tried to get an estimate of the SD of team talent in SH% ... we got imaginary numbers! Now, we can get a better answer. Here's the Palmer/Tango method for the 30 teams' six-year totals:

SD(observed) = 0.543 percentage points
SD(luck)     = 0.463 percentage points
--------------------------------------
SD(talent)   = 0.284 percentage points

That 0.28 percentage points has to be an underestimate. As explained in the previous post, the "all shots are the same" binomial luck estimate is necessarily too high. If we drop it by 9 percent, as we did earlier, we get

SD(observed) = 0.543 percentage points
SD(luck)     = 0.421 percentage points
--------------------------------------
SD(talent)   = 0.343 percentage points

We also need to bump it for the fact that this is the talent distribution for a six-season span -- which is necessarily tighter than a one-season distribution (since teams tend to regress to the mean over time, even slightly). But I don't know how much to bump, so I'll just leave it where it is.

That 0.34 points is almost exactly what we got last post. Which makes sense -- all we did was multiply our sample size by five. 

The real difference, though, is the credibility of the estimate. Last post, it was completely dependent on our guess that the binomial SD(luck) was 9 percent too high. The difference between guessing and not guessing was huge -- 0.34 points, versus zero points.  In effect, without guessing, we couldn't prove there was any talent at all!

But now, we do have evidence of talent ... and guessing adds only around 0.6 points. If you refuse to allow a guess of how shots vary in quality ... well, you still have evidence, without guessing at all, that teams must vary in talent with an SD of at least 0.284 percentage points.




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Saturday, December 13, 2014

True talent levels for NHL team shooting percentage

How much of the difference in team shooting percentage (SH%) is luck, and how much is talent? That seems like it should be pretty easy to figure out, using the usual Palmer/Tango method.

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Let's start with the binomial randomness inherent in shooting. 

In 5-on-5 tied situations in 2013-14 (the dataset I'm using for this entire post), the average team took 721 shots. At a 8 percent SH%, one SD of binomial luck is

The square root of (0.08 * 0.92 / 721)

... which is almost exactly one percentage point.

That's a lot. It would move an average team about 10 positions up or down in the standings -- say, from 7.50 (16th) to 8.50 (4th). 

If you want to compare that to Corsi ... for CF% (defined as the percentage of shots at goal which go to the offense), the SD due to binomial luck is also (coincidentally) about one percentage point. That would take a 50.0% team to 51.0%, which is only maybe three places in the standings.

That's one reason that SH% isn't as reliable an indicator as Corsi: a run of luck can make you look like the best or worst in the in that category, instead of just moving you a few spots.

----

If we just go to the data and observe the SD of actual team SH%, it also comes out to about one percentage point. 

Since

SD(talent)^2 = SD(observed)^2 - SD(luck)^2

we get

SD(talent)^2 = 1.0 - 1.0 

Which equals zero. And so it appears there's no variance in talent at all -- that SH% is, indeed, completely random!

But ... not necessarily. For two reasons.

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First, var(observed) is itself random, based on what happened in the 2013-14 season. We got a value of around 1.00, but it could be that the "true" value, the average we'd get if we re-ran the season an infinite number of times, is different. 

How much different could it be? I wrote a simulation to check. I ran 5,000 seasons of 30 teams, each with 700 shots and a shooting percentage of 8.00 percent. 

As expected, the average of those 5,000 SDs was around 1.00. But the 5,000 values varied with an SD of 0.133 percentage points. (Yes, that's the SD of a set of 5,000 SDs.)  So the standard 95% confidence interval gives us a range of (0.83, 1.27). 

That doesn't look like it would make a whole lot of difference in our talent estimate ... but it does. 

At the top end of the confidence interval, an observed SD of 1.27, we'd get

SD(talent) squared  = 1.27 squared - 1.00 squared 
                    = 0.52 squared

That would put the SD of talent at 0.52 percentage points, instead of zero. That's a huge difference numerically, and a huge difference in how we think of SH% talent. Without the confidence interval, it looks like SH% talent doesn't exist at all. With the confidence interval, not only does it appear to exist, but we see it could be substantial.

Why is the range so wide? It's because the observed spread isn't much different from the binomial luck. In this case, they're identical, at 1.00 each. In other situations or other sports, they're farther apart. In MLB team wins, the SD of actual wins is almost double the theoretical SD from luck. In the NHL, it's about one-and-a-half times as big. In the NBA ... not sure; it's probably triple, or more. 

If you have a sport where the range of talent is bigger than the range of luck, your SD will be at least 1.4 times as big as you'd see otherwise -- and 1.4 times is a significant enough signal to not be buried in the noise. But if the range of talent is only, say, 40% as large as the range of luck, your expected SD will be only 1.077 times as big -- that is, only eight percent larger. And that's easy to miss in all the random noise.

------

Can we narrow down the estimate with more seasons of data? 

For 2011-12, SD(observed) was 0.966, which actually gives an imaginary number for SD(talent) -- the square root of a negative estimate of var(talent). In other words, the teams were closer than we'd expect them to be even if they were all identical! 

For 2010-11, SD(observed) was 0.88, which is even worse. In 2009-10, it was 1.105. Well, that works: it suggests SD(talent) = 0.47 percentage points. For 2008-09, it's back to imaginary numbers, with SD(observed) = 0.93. (Actually, even 2013-14 gave a negative estimate ... I've been saying SD(luck) and SD(observed) were both 1.00, but they were really 1.01 and 0.99, respectively.)

Out of five seasons, we get four impossible situations, the teams are closer together than we'd expect even if they were identical!

That might be random. It might be something wrong with our assumption that talent and luck are independent. Or, it might be that there's something else wrong. 

I think it's that "something else". I think that it's we're not using a good enough assumption about shot types.

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Our binomial luck calculation assumed that all the shots were the same, that every shot had an identical 8% chance of becoming a goal. If you use a more realistic assumption, the effects of luck come out lower.

The typical team in the dataset scored about 56 goals. If that's 700 shots at 8 percent, the luck SD is 1 percent, as we found. But suppose those 56 goals come from a combination of high-probability shots and low-probability shots, like this:

For instance: 

 5 goals =   5 shots at 100% 
15 goals =  30 shots at  50%
30 goals = 300 shots at  10%
 6 goals = 365 shots at   1.64%
-------------------------------
56 goals = 700 shots at   8%

If you do it that way, the luck SD drops from 1.0% to 0.91%.

And that makes a big difference. 1.00 squared minus 0.91 squared is around 0.4 squared. Which means: if that pattern of shots is correct, then the SD of team SH% talent is 0.4 points. 

That's pretty meaningful, about five places in the standings.

I'm not saying that shot pattern is accurate... it's a drastic oversimplification. But "all shots the same" is also an oversimplification, and the one that gives you the most luck. Any other pattern will have less randomness. 

What is actually the right pattern? I have no idea. But if you find one that splits the difference, where the luck SD drops only to 0.95% or something ... you'll still get SD(talent) around 0.35 percentage points, which is still meaningfully different from zero.

(UPDATE: Tango did something similar to this for baseball defense, to avoid a too-high estimate for variation in how teams convert balls-in-play to outs.  He describes it here.)

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What's right? Zero? 0.35? 0.53? We could use some other kinds of evidence. Here's some other data that could help, from the hockey research community.

These two studies, that I pointed to in an earlier post, found year-to-year SH% correlations in the neighborhood of 0.15. Since the observed SD is about 1.0, that would put the talent SD in the range of 0.15. That seems reasonable, and consistent with the confidence intervals we just saw and the guesses we just made.

Var(talent) for Corsi doesn't have these problems, so it's easy to figure. If you assume a game's number of shots is constant, and binomial luck applies to whether those shots are for or against -- not a perfect model, but close enough -- the estimate of SD(talent) is around 4 percentage points.

Converting that to goals:

-- one talent SD in SH% =  1 goal
-- one talent SD in CF% = 10 goals

So, Corsi is 10 times as useful to know as SH%! Well, that might be a bit misleading: CF% is based on both offense and defense, while SH% is offense only. So the intuitive take on the ratio is probably only 5 times. 

Still: Corsi talent dwarfs SH% talent when it comes to predicting future performance, by a weighting of 5 to 1. No wonder Corsi is so much more predictive!

Either way, it doesn't mean that SH% is meaningless. This analysis suggests that teams who have a very high SH% are demonstrating a couple of 5-on-5 tied goals worth of talent. (And, of course, a proportionate number of other goals in other situations.)

-----

And, if I'm not mistaken ... again coincidentally, one point of CF% is worth the same, in terms of what it tells you about a team's talent, as one point of SH%. (Of course, SH% is much harder to achieve -- only a few of teams are as much as 1 point of SH% above or below average, while almost every team is above or below 51.0% CF%.)

So, instead of using Corsi alone ... just add CF% and SH%! That only works in 5-on-5 tied situations -- otherwise, it's ruined by score effects. But I wouldn't put too much trust in any shot study that doesn't adjust for score effects, anyway.

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I started thinking about this after the shortened 2012-13 season, when the Toronto Maple Leafs had an absurdly high SH% in 5-on-5 tied situations (10.82, best in the league), but an absurdly low CF% (43.8%, second worst to Edmonton).

My argument is: if you're trying to project the Leafs' scoring talent, you can't just use the Corsi and ignore the SH%. If the Leafs are 2 points above average in SH%, that tells you as much about their talent as two Corsi points. Instead of projecting the Leafs to score like a 43.8% Corsi team, you have to project them to score like, maybe, a 45.8% team. Which means that instead of second worst, maybe they're probably only fifth or sixth worst.

That's almost exactly what I estimated a year ago, based on a completely different method and set of assumptions. Neither analysis is perfect, and there's still lots of randomness in the data and uncertainty in the assumptions ... but, still, it's nice to see the results kind of confirmed.




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Thursday, December 11, 2014

The best NHL players create higher quality shots

A couple of months ago, I pointed to data that showed team shot quality is a real characteristic of a team, and not just random noise which the hockey analytics consensus believes it to be. 

That had to do with opposition shot distance. In 2013-14, the Wild allowed only 32 percent of opposing shots from in close, as compared to the Islanders, who allowed 61 percent. Those differences are far too large to be explained by luck.

Here's one more argument, that -- it seems to me -- is almost undeniable evidence that SH% must be a real team skill.

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It's conventional wisdom that some players shoot better than others, right? In a 1991 skills competition, Ray Bourque shot out four targets in four shots. The Hull brothers (and son) were well-known for their ability to shoot. Right now, Alexander Ovechkin is considered the best pure scorer in the league.*

(*Update: yeah, that's not quite right, as a reader points out on Twitter.)

In 1990-91, Brett Hull scored 86 goals with a 22.1 percent SH%. Nobody would argue that was just luck, right? You probably do have to regress that to the mean -- his career average was only 15.7 percent -- but you have to recognize that Brett Hull was a much better shooter than average.

Well, if that's true for players, it's true for teams, right? Teams are just collections of players. The only way out is to take the position that Hull just cherry-picked his team's easiest shots, and he was really just stealing shooting percentage from his teammates. 

That's logically possible. In fact, I think it's actually true in another context, NBA players' rebounds. It doesn't seem likely for hockey, but, still, I figured, I have to check.

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I went to hockey-reference.com and found the top 10 players in "goals created" in 2008-09. (I limited the list to one player per team.)  

For each of those players, I checked his team's shooting percentage with and without him on the ice, in even-strength situations in road games, the following season. (Thanks to "Super Shot Search," as usual, for the data.)  

As expected, their teams generally shot better with them than without them:

-----------------------
With  Without
-----------------------
10.1   5.8   Ovechkin
 5.5   9.3   Malkin
 7.1   5.3   Parise
 6.0   8.2   Carter 
10.3   9.1   Kovalchuk
 8.9   5.7   Datsyuk
10.8   7.5   Iginla
10.7   7.2   Nash
 9.8   7.5   Staal
 9.0   9.1   Getzlaf
-----------------------
 9.4   7.5   Average
-----------------------

Eight of the ten players improved their team's SH%. Weighting all players equally, the average increase came out to +1.9 percentage points, which is substantial. 

It would be hard to argue, I think, that this could be anything other than player influence. 

It looks way too big to be random. It can't be score effects, because these guys probably play roughly the same number of minutes per game regardless of the score. It can't be bias on the part of home-team shot counters, because these are road games only. 

And, it can't be players stealing from teammates, because the numbers are for all teammates on the ice at the same time. You can't steal quality shots from players on the bench.

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I should mention that there was also an effect for defense, but it was so small you might as well call it zero. The opposition had a shooting percentage of 7.7 percent with one of those ten players on the ice, and 7.8 percent without. 

That kind of makes sense -- the players in that list are known for their scoring, not their defense. I wonder if we'd find a real effect if chose the players on some defensive scale instead? Maybe Selke Trophy voting?

Also ... what's with Malkin? On offense, the Penguins shot 3.8 percentage points worse on his shifts. On defense, the Penguins opponents shot 3.8 percent better. Part of the issue is that his "off" shifts are Sidney Crosby's "on" shifts. But even his raw numbers are unusually low/high.

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Speaking of Crosby ... if you don't believe that the good players have consistently high shot quality, Crosby's record should help convince you. Every year of his career, the Penguins had higher quality shots with Crosby on the ice than without:

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With  Without 
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11.7   9.4   2008-09 Crosby
10.1   7.1   2009-10 
 9.6   6.9   2010-11
13.9   7.3   2011-12
13.2   8.8   2012-13
10.4   6.5   2013-14
 7.1   7.0   2014-15 (to 12/9)
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10.9   7.6   Average
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Sidney Crosby shifts show a consistent increase of 3.3 percentage points -- even including the first third of the current season at full weight. 

You could argue that's just random, but it's a tough sell.

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Now, for team SH%, you could still make an argument that goes something like this:


"Of course, superstars like Sidney Crosby create better quality shots. Everyone always acknowledged that, and this blog post is attacking a straw man. The real point is ... there aren't that many Sidney Crosbys, and, averaged over a team's full roster, their effects are diluted to the point where team differences are too small to matter."

But are they really too small to matter?  How much do the Crosby numbers affect the Penguins' totals?

Suppose we regress Crosby's +3.3 to the mean a bit, and say that the effect is really more like 2.0 points. In 2013-14, about 38 percent of the Penguins' 865 (road, even-strength) shots came with Crosby on the ice. That means that the Crosby shifts raised the team's overall road SH% by about 0.76 percentage points. 

That's not dilute at all. Looking at the overall team 5-on-5 road shooting percentages, 0.76 points would move an average team up or down about 8 positions in the rankings.

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Based on all this, I think it would be very, very difficult to continue arguing that team shooting percentage is just random.

Admittedly, that still doesn't mean it's important. Because, even if it's not just random, how is it that all these hockey sabermetric studies have found them so ineffective in projecting future performance? 

The simple answer, I think, is: weak signal, lots of noise. 

I have some ideas about the details, and will try to get them straight in my mind for next a future post. Those details, I think, might help explain the Leafs -- which is one of the issues that got this debate started in the first place.



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Tuesday, December 09, 2014

Corsi vs. Tango

Tom Tango is questioning the conventional sabermetric wisdom on Corsi. In a few recent posts, he presents evidence that Corsi can be improved upon as a predictor of future NHL team performance. Specifically: goals are important, too.

That has always seemed reasonable to me. In fact, it seems so reasonable that I wonder why it's disputed. But it is. 

Goals is just shots multiplied by shooting percentage (SH%). The consensus among the hockey research community is that their studies show SH% is not a skill that carries over from year to year. And, therefore, goals can't matter once you have shots.

I've been disputing that for a while now -- at least seven posts worth (here's the first). But I've been doing it from argument. Tango jumps right to the equations. He split seasons in half randomly, and ran a regression to try to predict one half from the other half. Goals proved to be very significant. In fact, when you try to predict, you have to weight goals *four times as heavily* as Corsis. (Five times as heavily as unsuccessful Corsis.)

In a tongue-in-cheek jab at statistics named after their inventors, he called that new statistic the "Tango." 

Despite Tango's regression results, the hockey analysts who commented still disagree. I'm still surprised by that ... the hockey sabermetrics community are pretty smart guys, very good at what they do, and a lot of them have been hired by NHL teams. I've had times when I've wondered if I'm missing something ... I mean, when it's 1 dabbler against 20 analysts who do this every day, it's probably the 20 who are right. Well, now it's two against the world instead of one ... and the second is Tango, which makes me a little more confident. 

Also ... Tango jumps right to the actual question, and proves goals significantly improve the prediction. That's hard to argue with; at least, it's harder to argue with than what I'm doing, which is attacking the assumption that shooting percentage is all random. 

You can see one response here, and Tango's reply here.  

Tango got his data from war-on-ice.com, who agreed to make it available to all (thank you!!!). I was planning to do some work with the data myself, but ... I guess Tango and I think about things from different angles, because, the more I thought about it, the more of my "usual" arguments I thought of, the less direct ones. So, there'll be another post coming soon. I'll play with the data when my thoughts wind up somewhere that I need to look at it.

For this post, a few of my observations from Tango's posts and the discussion that followed.

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In one of his posts, Tango wrote,


"One of the first things that (many) people did was to run a correlation of Corsi v Tango, come up with an r=.98 or some number close to 1 and then conclude: “see, it adds almost nothing”. If only that were true. "

Tango is absolutely right (you should read the whole thing). It's just another case of jumping to conclusions from a high or low correlation coefficient.

Sabermetrics is pretty good at figuring out good and bad. It has to be -- I mean, even fans and sportswriters are pretty good at it, and the whole point of sabermetrics is to do better. We're already in "high correlation" territory, able to separate the good teams and players from the bad teams and players pretty easily. 

Find a 10-year-old kid who's a serious sports fan -- any sport -- and get him to rank the players from best to worst -- whether by formula, or by raw statistics. Then, find the best sabermetric statistic you can, and rank the players that way.

I bet the correlation would be over 0.9. Just by gut.

We're already well into the .9s, when it comes to understanding hockey. Any improvements are going to be marginal, at least if you measure them by correlation. And so, it follows that *of course* Tango and Corsi are going to correlate highly. 

Also, and as Tom again points out, if Corsi already has a high correlation with something, at first glance, Tango can appear to increase it only slightly. If you start with, say, 0.92, and Tango improves it to 0.93 ... well, that doesn't look like much, intuitively. But it IS much. If you look at it another way -- still intuitively -- it was 8% uncorrelated before, and now it's only 7% uncorrelated. You've improved your predictive ability by 12%!

The point is, you have to think about what the numbers actually mean, instead of just having it click "93 isn't much bigger than 92, so who cares?"

Tom illustrates the point by noting that, even though Tango and Corsi appear to be highly correlated to each other, Tango improves a related correlation from .44 to .50. There must be some significant differences there.

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There's a more important argument, though, than to not underestimate how much better .93 is than .92. And that argument is: *it's not about the correlation*. 

Yes, it's nice to have a higher and higher r-squared, and be able to reduce your error more and more. But it's not really error reduction we're after. It's *knowledge*. 

It's quite possible that a model that gives you a low correlation actually gives you MORE of an understanding of hockey than a model that gives you a high correlation. Here's an easy example: the correlation between points in the standings, and whether or not you make the playoffs, is very high, close to 1.0. The correlation between your Corsi and whether or not you make the playoffs is lower, maybe 0.7 or something (depending how you do it -- which is another reason not to rely on the correlation alone). 

Which tells you more about hockey that you didn't already know? Obviously, it's the Corsi one. Everyone already knows that points determine whether you qualify for the playoffs. When you find out that shots seem to be important, that's new knowledge -- the knowledge that outshooting your opponents means something. (Of course, *what* it means is something you have to figure out yourself -- correlation doesn't tell you what type of relationship you've found.)

And that's what's going on here. Corsi has a high correlation with future winning, but Corsi *and goals* has an even higher correlation (to a significant extent). What does that tell us? 

Goals matter, not just shots. 

That's an important finding!  You can't dismiss it just because the predictions don't improve that much. If you do, you're missing the point completely. 

You wouldn't do that in other aspects of life, would you? Those faulty airbags in the news recently, the ones that kill people with shrapnel ... those constitute a small, small fraction of collision deaths. If you looked only at predicting fatalities, knowing about those airbags is a rounding error. 

But the point is not just to predict fatality rates!  Well, not for most of us. If you're an insurance company, then, sure, maybe it doesn't make that much difference to you, a couple of cents on each policy you write. But that doesn't mean the information isn't important. It's just important for different questions. Like, how can we reduce fatalities? We can reduce fatalities by replacing the defective air bags!

Also, the information means it is false to state that faulty airbags don't matter. You can still argue that they don't matter MUCH, relative to the overall total of collision deaths; that might be true. But for that, you can't argue from correlation coefficients. You have to argue from ... well, you can use the regression equation. You can say, "only 1 person in a million dies from the airbag, but 1000 in a million die from other causes."

In this case, Tango found that a goal matters four times as much as a shot. If, roughly speaking, there are 12 shots for every goal, then every 12 shots, you get 12 "points" of predictive value from the shots, and 4 "points" of predictive value from the goals. 

The ratio isn't 1000:1 like for the airbags. It's 3:1. How can you dismiss that? Not only is it important knowledge about hockey, but the magnitude of the effect is really going to affect your predictions.

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Why does the conventional wisdom dispute the relevance of goals? Because the consensus is that shooting percentage is random -- just like clutch hitting in baseball is random.

Why do they think that? Because the year-to-year team correlation for shooting percentage is very low.

I think it's the "low number means no effect" fallacy. Here are two studies I Googled. This one found an r-squared of .015, and here's another at .03. 

If you take the square root of those r-squareds, to give you correlations, you get 0.12 and 0.17, respectively.

Those aren't that small. Especially if you take into account how much randomness there is in shooting percentage. A signal of 0.17 in all that noise might be pretty significant.

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It's well-known that both Corsi and shooting percentage change with the score of the game. When you're up by one goal, your SH% goes up by almost a whole percentage point -- and your Corsi goes down by four points. When you're up two or more, the differences are even bigger. 

That's probably because when teams are ahead, they play more defensively. Their opponents, who are trailing, play more aggressively -- they press in the offensive zone more, and get more shots. 

So, teams in the lead see their shots go down. But their expected SH% goes up, because they get a lot of good scoring chances when the opposition takes more chances -- more breakaways, odd-man rushes, and so on.

It occurred to me that these score effects could, in theory, explain Tango's finding. 

Suppose Team A has 30 Corsis and 5 goals in a game, and Team B has 30 Corsis and no goals. 

Even if shooting percentage is indeed completely random, team A is probably better than team B. Why? Because, with 5 goals, team B probably had a lead most of the game. If it had 30 Corsis despite leading, it must be a much better Corsi team to overcome the “handicap” of shooting so much when it’s ahead. So, when it’s behind, it’ll probably kick the other team’s butt.

I don't think Tango's finding is *all* score effects. And, even if it were, all that would mean is that if you didn't explicitly control for score, "Tango" would be a more accurate statistic than Corsi. And most of the hockey studies I've seen *don't* control for score.

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Here's one empirical result that might help -- or maybe won't help at all, I'm actually not sure. (Tell me what you think.)

My hypothesis has been that some teams have better shooting percentages, along with lower Corsis, because they choose to set up for higher quality shots. Instead of taking a 5% shot from the point, they take a 50/50 chance on setting up a 10% shot from closer in. 

As I have written, I think the evidence shows some support for that hypothesis. In 5-on-5 tied situations, there's a negative correlation between Corsi rate and SH%. In 2013-14 (raw stats here), it was -0.16. In the shortened 2012-13 season, it was -0.04. In 2011-12, -0.14. 

Translating the -0.14 into hockey: for every additional goal due to shot quality, teams lowered their Corsi by 2.1 shots.

That's a tradeoff of around 2 Corsis per goal. Tango found 4 Corsis per goal. Does that mean that two of Tango's four Corsis come from shot quality, and the other two come from score effects?

Not sure. There's probably too much randomness in there anyway to be confident, and I'm not completely sure that they're measuring the same thing. But, there it is, and I'll think about it some more.

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UPDATE, 30 minutes later: Colby Cosh pointed out, on Twitter, that Tango's regression used Corsi and goal *differential* -- offense minus defense.  That means the "goals against" factor is partially a function of save percentage, which partially reflects goalie talent, which, of course, carries over into the future. So, goalie talent absolutely has to be part of the explanation of the "goals" term.


So now we have two factors: score effects and goalie effects. Could that fully explain the predictive value of goals, without resort to shot quality?  I'll have to think about the actual numbers, whether the magnitudes could be high enough to cover the full "4 shots" coefficient.








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Tuesday, November 04, 2014

Corsi, shot quality, and the Toronto Maple Leafs, part VII

In previous posts, I've argued that when it comes to shots, NHL teams might differ in how they choose to trade quantity for quality. That might partly explain why the Toronto Maple Leafs, for the past few seasons now, have had ugly-looking shot stats, but with an above-average shooting percentage.

Skeptics argue that team shooting percentage (SH%) doesn't seem to have predictive value from season to season, which suggests it's luck rather than skill or strategy. But, at the same time, Corsi for teams seems to have a negative correlation to SH%, which is one piece of evidence that shot quality strategy might be a real issue.

Anyway, read the previous six posts for that argument. This is just an anecdote.

It comes from a piece by James Mirtle, the Maple Leafs beat writer for the Globe and Mail. Mirtle notes that the Toronto coaching staff has directed Morgan Rielly to increase his shot attempts:


[In the October 28 game vs. Buffalo,] Rielly rang up two assists – including a beauty cross-crease pass on James van Riemsdyk’s goal – and was all over the puck generally, generating nine shot attempts.

That propensity to shoot has been Rielly’s biggest shift from a year ago. The coaches want him putting more pucks on the net, and he has responded in dramatic fashion, with 2.8 shots a game compared to 1.3 in his rookie year despite similar ice time.

Even more impressively, Rielly leads all NHL defencemen in generating shot attempts, with 21.6 per 60 minutes at even strength, meaning he’s getting a look at the net roughly every 2.5 minutes he’s on the ice.

He’s winding up more frequently than not only every Leafs defenceman but every Leaf, including shot demon Phil Kessel, something that’s helping drive Toronto to respectable totals on the shot clock most nights.

Entering [the October 31] game against the injury-plagued Blue Jackets in Columbus, the Leafs have been outshot, but only by one: 281-280.

"I told myself this year that I would shoot more," Rielly said. 

Well, isn't that exactly the kind of thing Corsi skeptics should be looking for? It's evidence that coaching decisions can affect shot quantity and quality -- in other words, Corsi and SH%.

It's a small sample size -- the Leafs had played only nine games when Mirtle's piece came out -- but let's see what happens if we take Rielly's numbers at face value and make a few estimates.

Assume Rielly gets 20 minutes of ice time per game. If 80 percent of that is at even strength. it's 16 minutes at 5-on-5. Let's call it 15 to make the calculations easier.

Since he's generating 21.6 even-strength Corsis per 60 minutes, that's 5.4 even-strength Corsis per 15-minute game.*  

*I'm assuming that the "shot attempts" in the article refers to Corsi. If it refers to Fenwick, the effect is even larger than what I'm about to calculate, because the denominators are smaller (since Fenwick leaves out blocked shots).

Rielly's shots roughly doubled since last year, so let's assume his Corsis doubled too. That means his increase from last year must be about 2.7 Corsis per game. 

Last year, those extra 2.7 Rielly shot attempts would have been passes or stickhandles. Assuming half those attempts would have eventually resulted in shots by other players, the increase due to Rielly's shooting is down to 1.3. 

How significant is 1.3 Corsis per game?  In 2013-14, the Leafs were out-Corsied 4,342 to 3,259 at even strength, giving them a league-worst 42.9 Corsi percentage. If you add in 107 Corsis to the "for" side (1.3 times 82 games), it's now 4,342 to 3,366. That would bump Toronto to 43.7 percent. Now, only second worst.

It's not huge, but it's something that would indeed show up in the stats. And, according to Mirtle, it's something that's due to a deliberate coaching decision. 

How big would the effect be if the coaches decided everyone should shoot more, instead of just one defenseman whose minutes comprise only about six percent of total player ice-time?

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Also, you would think those extra shots would have to result in a reduction in shooting percentage, right?  Last year, when Rielly wasn't shooting as much, it was probably because he thought he could set up a better quality shot some other way. And, I would assume, Rielly's shots are taken farther from the net than average, since defensemen usually play the point. 

You could come up with a scenario where shot quality wouldn't drop ... maybe shots from the point lead to a lot of juicy rebounds, so long shots lead to a certain number of extra dangerous shots. Sure, that's possible. But I doubt if that effect, or any other, would make up the quality difference completely. If there were *never* a tradeoff between quantity and quality, every team would be shooting all the time. So, there must be some level of "dangerousness" above which a point shot is a good idea, and below which a pass is better. For shot quality would stay the same when Rielly shoots more, all his new shots would have to come in situations where not only was the shot the best move, but the shot was SO dangerous from the point that it would even be higher quality than the best alternative from closer in.

That's unlikely to be happening if Rielly now leads the league in shot attempts by defensemen. There aren't that many ultra-super-dangerous shot opportunities, never mind ultra-super-dangerous shot opportunities that Rielly wouldn't have taken advantage of last year.

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As I write this, it's only eleven Leaf games into the season, which is a very small sample size.  But I checked anyway.  (Here's a YTD link that may be outdated if you're reading this later than today.)

In those 11 games, the Leafs have an above-average Corsi at 50.9% in 5-on-5 tied situations. But they've scored only 5 goals in 121 shots. That's a shooting percentage of 4.13%, dead last in the league.  

There's not enough data for that to really be meaningful, but it's interesting nonetheless.




(There are seven parts. Part VI was previous. This is Part VII.)

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